In die afgelope tyd het twee senior Naspers-joernaliste, Tim du Plessis en Leopold Scholtz, laat blyk hulle sukkel 'n bietjie met sekere terme en te onomstootlike waarhede waarmee die Afrikaner sowat 20 jaar gelede in die ANC se vanghok ingejaag is...................
politieke kunsgreep op die hart en gemoed van die Afrikaner sal kom. In die afgelope tyd het twee senior Naspers-joernaliste, Tim du Plessis en Leopold Scholtz, laat blyk hulle sukkel 'n bietjie met sekere terme en te onomstootlike waarhede waarmee die Afrikaner sowat 20 jaar gelede in die ANC se vanghok ingejaag is, Du Plessis wat afskeid wil neem van versoening (wat sal Desmond sê, sy Nobelvredesprys teruggee?), en Scholtz wat meen te sê die Hollanders was dalk net so wreed in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog as die Duitsers (en 'n sedelessie vir die Afrikaner daaruit wil neem maar terselfdertyd wil maan ook die Afrikaner sal vir 'n slag die skoen aan 'n ander voet wil sien). Sulke uitlatings kan dui op 'n houdingsverandering. Die afleiding moet dan vanselfsprekend wees dat as so 'n houdingsverandering onder liberale Afrikaners wyd aanvaar word, hierdie houdingsverandering praktiese toepassing kan vind. Of soos daar in die Suid-Afrikaanse politieke koeterwaals gesê word: dit moet op strukturele en grondvlak geïmplementeer word.
In die Naspers-marmermagsale sal die volgende vraag, of dit dan nou in erns of in die verbygaan gevra word, aan die beurt kan kom: Moet ons steeds ons gewig agter die die Demokratiese Alliansie (DA) in verkiesings en ons propaganda gooi? Anders gestel: Is die DA nog dié politieke voertuig?
Al neig sy politiek en sy uitsprake al meer na die populistiese Swart kant, betoog en gooi die DA klip op Cosatu-saamtrekke, gaan boelie die DA-jeugliga 'n opgeskote Afrikanernedersetting soos Kleinfontein net om naam te maak by sy “constituency”, die jong lokasiegepeupel?
En wie of wat steun ons dan in die volgende verkiesing?
Ja, u het reg, teen hierdie tyd en met nog nie al die vrae gestel nie, moet Ton Vosloo, die groot gees agter Naspers se DA-steun, al vir die vyfde keer met 'n botteltjie vlugsout bygebring word.
Bygesê: In die problematiek oor waar dan heen met die DA in so 'n scenario-ontplooiing, is die posisie van die DA-arbeidersvleuel, Solidariteit van Flip Buys, nog nie eens naastenby “aangespreek” nie. En ook nie die van 'n menigte ander Afrikaner-belange-organisasies wat in die DA-skadu sit en dut nie.
Die slotsom dus oor Du Plessis en Scholtz se besinning (en nou word 'n sjimpansee, in sy eie gedagtes versonke en 'n vlieg wat al om sy kop draai, aangehaal : Soms sit ek en ek dink (besin), soms sit ek net.
Teen hierdie dooiepunt gestuit, waarom nie 'n saak of twee oorweeg om te sien waarom nie net die liberale Afrikaner nie maar die hele volk hom in tamatiestraat bevind.
ALLIANSIE-POLITIEK EN STRATEGIESE VENNOOTSKAPPE
Laat daar ter wille van helderheid in twee dele na die aard van hierdie tamatiestraat gekyk word.
Kortliks, deel een (1966 tot 1990): Die Afrikanervolk word na die sluipmoord op dr. H.F. Verwoerd dit ingeprent dat in die komende post-moderne samelewing volkskap as deurslaggewende politieke mobilseerder “verouderd” is, dat die beskerming wat sy volkskap in 'n grondwet en in 'n volksraad geniet, netsowel met wigte en teenwigte soos 'n handves van menseregte en 'n konstitusionele hof, gehandhaaf kan word.
Deel twee (1996 tot 2013): Die Afrikanervolk word vertel, in die aangesig van 'n duiselende Swart getalle-oorwig, dat koalisie/en of alliansiepolitiek sy politieke waardes en versugtinge, ook as kultuur/etniese/godsdienstige/taalgemeenskap, sal beskerm. Die waarnemer kan wel vra: Wat dan van 1990 tot 1996? Bygesê die datums is ter wille van maklike verduideliking gekies, die verwikkelinge kan sekerlik in fyner besonderhede verduidelik word.
Tussen 1990 (FW de Klerk se Rooi Vrydag-toespraak) en 1996 sien die waarnemer die verstommende agteruitgang van die Nasionale Party (NP), seker een van op sy dag paraatste volkspolitieke voertuie wat die Christen-Weste beleef het. Nie lank na die aanvaarding van die 1996-grondwet nie is die NP kapot. De Klerk tree tot die verbystering van 'Pik Botha en sulkes uit die sogenaamde regering van nasionale eenheid en gee opdrag aan die snuiter Marthinus van Schalkwyk op die NP se laaste rites te bedien.
Want die Era van Alliansiepolitiek het aangebreek.
Nou word daar lig opgesteek by 'n Jood, die Jode en die internasionale sionisme die vroedvrou van nie net sogenaamde alliansie-politiek hier te lande nie maar internasionaal. Kyk net hoe oorstelp rapporteer hierdie Jood, sy naam is Tony Leon, van die verstommende knieval van die Afrikanervolk voor hierdie sluipperd van 'n koalisiepolitiek waarin die dood vir die Afrikanervolk skuil. Die waarnemer sal sommer gou opmerk wat van die Afrikanervolk (en alle Westerse volke, dis nou internasionaal gesien), word die dag as alliansie-politiek (soos in Demokratiesse ALLIANSIE), sy buiging maak. So 'n volk word 'n “minderheid” teen die agtergrond van die vreemde menigte wat hom 'n bepaalde streek en ook die globale wêreld bevind. Let ook op hoe “culture”, dis seker maar Christelik-Westerse “ciluture” vir hierdie ryk Jood irriteeer. Let ook op dat hoewel die Jode bereid is om sekere leierskaplakens in sy alliansiepolitieke maaksel uit te deel, die eintlike beheer ferm in die Jode se hande bly (Leon is deur Helen Zille opgevolg):
Sandton, Crowne Plaza Hotel, Rosebank, Johannesburg, Januarie 23 2013
"Opposition Then and Now"
“I have not sought specifically in interviews, writings or speeches since my return to this country last October (terug as ambassadeur van Argentinië) to assess the general prospects and future of opposition in this country, and specifically the role and outlook for the Democratic Alliance (DA), which party I led for seven of its twelve year existence. ….I am always wary when people use ‘culture' as either a club or a shield- whether to justify rent-seeking riches or to denigrate minorities - since part of the founding settlement of our democracy was specifically to champion and celebrate and protect multi-culturalism and the individual choice to adopt as many cultural identities and practices as consistent with the injunction of ‘do no harm to others.' ...Someone defined ‘'leadership success" as the "success of the leader's successors". On that definition, and looking at the current track record and trajectory, I suppose that my many years leading this party and its predecessor could be termed "successful."
Opposition then:
On Saturday week, 2 February, we will note the twenty third anniversary of the famous speech of FW De Klerk in Parliament, which was in political terms of such thermo-nuclear intensity, that we are still living with its after effects today. One of the lesser consequences of that event was that it blind-sided the liberal opposition Democratic Party, among whose new members of parliament I was at the time, the freshly elected MP for Houghton. In essence, the conservative president of the country and leader of its National Party, in one swoop, appropriated most of the platform and manifesto of our party. ….In the aftermath of being sent to the new national assembly and constituent assembly with just 7 (out of 400) MPs, a major rethink was required. It was clear that if the party continued along the road it had trod for the previous thirty five years of existence it was headed for the scree slope of oblivion.
I was elected leader of this unhappy and uncertain band. I subsequently wrote that being leader back then was like being given a poisoned chalice. I ruefully noted (in a borrowed phrase) that "at times it tasted like something rustled up by Lucrezia Borgia on one of her more vengeful days." But the one advantage of having few expectations to meet (in truth, most of the media, many of our historic backers and the majority of our traditional -read English speaking, white and suburban - voters had written us off) is that you can define your own agenda and determine your tactics after fashioning a strategy without the burden of expectation.
….Shortly after our relatively stunning success in the 1999 election (we increased our voting share by over seven fold and added 31 new MPs to our team and went from being the seventh largest party to becoming the second largest and with it the title of "official opposition") we soon faced an important fork in the road. In the Western Cape, where the ANC had achieved the largest share of the vote, slightly ahead of the NP, we held the balance of power in that province, the only one where the NP, due its retention of Coloured support, beat us.
Notwithstanding our explicit pre-election commitment to forming opposition alliances to hold down the power of the ANC, I was placed under enormous pressure by some of our donors, many independent commentators, and most of the media (who in turn were under pressure from a victorious and very assertive ANC) to do a deal with the ANC and deliver the province to their control, with our party as junior governing partner. Having two years before, resisted the tempting offer of Nelson Mandela to enter his government, I found the pressure significant, but the suggestion easy to rebut: we had promised the voters strong opposition and we could hardly deliver on this claim by essentially closing down, or significantly compromising, the independent opposition role the voters had entrusted us with.
Thus the deal was made with the NP. Under it, Helen Zille and others achieved provincial ministries and we found ourselves sharing power with a party we disliked, but with our strategic project intact (consolidating the highly fragmented opposition and establishing a governing bulwark against the increasingly hegemonic ANC, then rapidly consolidating its power over the rest of society). We were able within a year of that coalition to formalize our arrangement - under our leadership and based on our core principles - by forming the Democratic Alliance. By December 2000, the party achieved over 23% of the vote in the national local government elections -a result which took a further eleven years to replicate in the 2011 local government elections.
…It was in the period of the NNP desertion to the ANC (2001-2004) that the DA faced its most fraught challenges. We were the largest opposition party, but the very space which opposition claimed for itself and which the constitution demarcated was under enormous challenge. I dubbed this phase "the closing of the open society" (hierdie is 'n George Soros-treflyn, dié “open society”). Although we identified the "open and opportunity society" as the summary of our policy and positioning, in truth at the height of the Mbeki presidency there were few takers for this position in wider society.
The press, with a few honourable exceptions, had been suborned by the government agenda, and with the exception of the government policy on HIV-AIDS, few leaders and organisations in civil society wished to pick a fight with the ruling party. Within the opposition itself, parties outside the DA such as the NNP, ID, IFP found it easier to accommodate themselves within the paradigm, if not the formal membership, of the governing ideology. We had a bigger reach than ever before, but getting our message across - and even the concept of robust opposition recognized -had a hard swim in such murky waters.
The winning of the Cape Town municipality and the installation of Helen Zille as its mayor (in the teeth of a virulent campaign against us by the ANC with a co-opted ID at its side), once again as a result of intricate coalition building, turned the tide...